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Abstract
We study selection rules: voting procedures used by committees to choose whether to
place an issue on their agenda. At the selection stage of the model, committee members
are uncertain about their final preferences. They only have some private information
about these preferences. We show that voters become more conservative when the se-
lection rule itself becomes more conservative. The decision rule has the opposite effect.
We compare these voting procedures to the designation of an agenda setter among the
committee, and to a utilitarian social planner with all the ex interim private information.
Keywords: Selection Rules, Strategic Voting, Asymmetric Information, Agenda Setting,
Citizens’ Initiative.
JEL classification: D72, D83.
1 Introduction
Before they can be decided according to a majority rule, cases brought to the Supreme Court
of the United States need to be approved for selection by at least four of the nine justices. This
Rule of Four, which is rather a custom than a constitutional requirement, was used as a defense
by the justices when in the mid-1930s the Court came under fire from the President and the
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Congress. It was accused, among other charges, of “using its discretionary jurisdiction to duck
important cases,”1 to which the justices responded that they use a submajority rule precisely
because they prefer “to be at fault in taking jurisdiction rather than to be at fault in rejecting
it.”2 The argument of the justices seems obvious at first, it is easier to gather four votes than
five. Yet it is not so clear once we take strategic behavior into account: wouldn’t the justices
offset the effects of the selection rule by adjusting their individual behavior? We show that it is
not the case by presenting a model in which rational individual behavior strengthens the effects
of the selection rule: voters become more conservative as the rule becomes more stringent.
More generally we look at the effect of democratizing the agenda by comparing the use of a
voting rule at the selection stage to letting a member of the committee select the agenda, and
to socially optimal selection.
Selection rules are not limited to the Supreme Court.3 For instance, any member of the
French Assemble´e Nationale can place a proposal on the agenda of the parliament as long as the
proposed law doesn’t increase expenditure for the government. In the United States Congress,
bills must be approved by vote in a specialized standing committee before they can be brought
to the floor. Citizens’ initiatives, which allow a group of citizens to obtain the organization
of a referendum by way of petitions, are another form of selection rules. A general concern
about citizens’ initiatives is that they tend to bring too many issues to the agenda. Our study
suggests that outcomes may be particularly sensitive to the selection rule that is chosen because
of the positive feedback between the direct effect of a change in the rule and the indirect effect
on behavior. Finally, recruiting committees often use selection rules as well.
Our model allows us to analyze and compare these rules. To our knowledge, it is the first
formal analysis of selection rules in a rational voting framework. Our three working assumption
181 Cong. Rec. 2809-2812 (1939).
2Hearings on S. 2176 before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 74th Cong. 1st sess., 9-10 (1935) (statement
of Justice Van Devanter). We found a discussion of these events and the citations in Epstein and Knight (1998)
p.86 who refer to a memorandum titled “The Rule of Four” that justice Marshall circulated to conference Sept.
21, 1983. For a detailed account of the selection procedure at the Supreme Court, see Perry (1994).
3State Supreme Courts also use selection rules. In California, for example, the justices use a supermajority
rule of four out of seven justices.
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are (i) that voters are uncertain about their preferences at the selection stage; (ii) that they
have private information; and (iii) that their preferences are uncorrelated (conditional on the
public information embedded in the prior), so that we are in a pure private value framework.
At least two arguments support the assumption that voters are uncertain about their final
preferences. First, voters are likely to have less information about the issue at the selection
stage than at the decision stage. Once an issue is selected, hearings of experts and stakeholders
may be organized, public attention and the media may help produce and aggregate informa-
tion about the issue itself and the preferences of the people which may affect those of their
representatives. Second, the process leading to the final proposal is often complex and tends to
generate uncertainty at the outset about the nature of the final proposal. In parliaments, when
a bill is introduced to the floor, it usually goes through long series of amendments that often
modify the text of the proposal substantially and unpredictably. Similarly, at the Supreme
Court, there is uncertainty about which of the justices will be assigned to write the opinion
and about which exact policy relevant points will be raised. Whereas the literature on agenda
setting has generally focused on the process leading from the initial proposal to its final version,
we are more interested in how initial proposals (issues) are selected and placed on the agenda
in the first place. Our approach is to black-box this transformation process and merely assume
that it creates uncertainty about what will be voted on in the final stage.
There are two rounds of voting. In the first round, the selection stage, committee members
vote to select an issue. In the second round, the decision stage, they decide whether to adopt
a proposal or maintain the status quo. Even though voters’ preferences are private, one’s
expected utility at the selection stage depends indirectly on the preferences, hence on the
private information, of other voters since they determine the probability that the proposal will
pass the final round if it is selected. Therefore, the selection stage aggregates strategically
relevant information about the probabilities of different outcomes. Rational voters condition
their decision on the event that their vote is pivotal. The exact information conveyed by the
pivotal event, however, depends on the selection rule. When a rule requires a higher tally of
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votes to select an issue, the event that a single vote is pivotal conveys the information that
more voters are likely to favor the proposal at the decision stage. Therefore, conditional on
being pivotal at the selection stage, a voter who votes to select an issue faces a higher chance
that the status quo will be reversed when the selection rule is more stringent. When selecting
an issue, however, a voter also keeps the option to vote against change in the second round so
this increased probability is not sufficient to explain her behavior. Rather, the voter compares
the probability that the proposal passes when she eventually prefers it to when she doesn’t.
We show that the probability that the proposal passes given that the voter does not support
it increases at a higher rate with the selection rule than the same probability given that the
voter supports the proposal. In order to compensate for that, voters become individually more
conservative when the rule itself is more conservative. Remarkably, this result does not depend
on the particular distribution of preferences or on the size of the committee. It derives from a
general property of sums of independent Bernoulli random variables.
Our result can also be interpreted using the control loss effects studied in Strulovici (2010).
A pivotal voter in the first round faces two types of risks if she loses control of the decision in
the second round. The loser trap effect is the loss she may incur if she turns out to lose from
the proposal but the other voters can impose it on her. In contrast, the winner frustration
effect is the loss she may incur if she turns out to prefer the proposal but the other voters
can impose the status quo. Our analysis of the effect of the selection rule on the pivotal event
shows that a more conservative selection rule increases the loser trap effect by increasing the
risk, conditionally on being pivotal, that the proposal is eventually adopted. Conversely it
decreases the winner frustration effect. If the cost of going to the second round is low, however,
the winner frustration effect is weak compared to the loser trap effect, and therefore a more
conservative selection rule makes experimentation less attractive, and the voters respond by
becoming more conservative.
These properties also allow us to compare voting rules to other selection procedures. We
show that an individual agenda setter chosen from the committee is always individually more
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conservative than a committee member under the one-vote selection rule, but less conservative
than a committee member under the unanimous selection rule. We also compare the equilib-
rium choice under a voting rule to the choice of a utilitarian social planner with all the private
information at the selection stage. The least conservative equilibrium under the one-vote selec-
tion rule is always too accepting, while the most conservative equilibrium under the unanimous
selection rule is always too conservative.
Related Literature. The seminal literature on voting under asymmetric information (Austen-
Smith and Banks, 1996; Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1996, 1997, 1998; Myerson, 1998) focused
on the jury model in which agents have common preferences (with possibly heterogeneous inten-
sities) conditional on an unknown state of the world, and private information about this state
of the world. An important insight of this literature is that a strategic voter should reason
as if her vote were pivotal since it is the only event in which her vote has any effect on the
collective decision. Under any voting rule, the pivotal event conveys some information about
the votes of others, and therefore about their private information and what it means about the
state of the world. In our model, each voter’s payoff is independent from the information of
others. Because of the two-round procedure, however, a voter who is uncertain about her final
preferences cares about the preferences of others as they carry information about the chances
of the proposal in the final round. To model voters’ uncertainty about their own preferences,
we draw on the setup of Barbera and Jackson (2004) to which we add asymmetric information.
Our comparative statics result is reminiscent of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998), but its
spirit is quite different. In their model, the harder the voting rule makes it to convict, the more
people vote to convict, possibly against their signal. This story is one of very strong negative
feedback that can offset the purpose of a change in the rule. Our story is one of positive
feedback that makes the outcome very sensitive to a change in the rule.
This paper is related to the literatures on group experimentation and conservatism. The
most closely related papers are Fernandez and Rodrik (1991), Strulovici (2010) and Lizzeri
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and Yariv (2011). Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) show that majority voting in groups leads a
status quo bias in the presence of individual uncertainty on the benefits of a reform, even if it
is certain that the reform will be beneficial on aggregate. Strulovici (2010) considers a more
general dynamic framework in which individuals may learn that they gain from the reform at
any point in time. In both models, the asymmetry of information is very particular: at any
point in time, some individuals know that they gain from the reforms while those that are
uncertain have homogeneous beliefs about whether they win or lose from the reform. In these
frameworks, no information is aggregated when voting. With a more general structure, the
event that a voter is pivotal conveys information about the preferences of other voters that
matters because it affects the chances that the reform passes in later rounds. While our result
about the effect of the first-stage voting rule relies entirely on these effects, our result about the
effect of the second-stage rule (the decision rule) is related to Li (2001): agents are more willing
to experiment and bear the cost of gathering information when the final acceptance rule is more
conservative. As we already mentioned, our results can be interpreted by using the loss control
effects studied Strulovici (2010), and we provide these interpretations throughout the rest of
the paper. Lizzeri and Yariv (2011) consider a jury model, where the final vote is preceded
by possibly multiple rounds of deliberation. The deliberation phase is modeled as a dynamic
information acquisition process, such that at each stage, the members of the committee vote
between acquiring one more piece of information or proceed to the final vote. They show that
the voting rule in the deliberation phase matters much more than the voting rule at the decision
stage. In particular, they find that, under some relevant conditions, the decision rule has no
impact on the equilibrium outcomes of the game. In our model as well the decision rule has a
limited impact on equilibrium outcomes, since voters will tend to compensate a more stringent
rule by being less selective. The deliberation rule ( which corresponds to our selection rule),
however, plays a more important role. There is a similar flavor in our model where the effects
of the selection rule are amplified by the voters.
Several authors have built on the pivotal voting literature to model multiple-round elections
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(Piketty, 2000; Razin, 2003; Iaryczower, 2008; Shotts, 2006; Meirowitz and Shotts, 2009). In
these papers, voting in earlier stages provides information to the voters later stages. This creates
a signaling motive for voters in the first stages. By contrast, the signaling channel is completely
absent from our two-round model. An early paper looking at sequential voting procedures with
private information is Ordeshook and Palfrey (1988). Through examples, they identify both
the signaling channel and the possibility to learn about the preferences of others, but agents
are certain about their own preferences. A more recent paper, Hummel (2012), considers a
model of repeated elections with three candidates in which, as in our model, the outcome of
earlier rounds is informative about the distribution from which the preferences of other voters
are drawn. In his model, however, voters learn their own preferences at the outset.
Our work is also connected to the literature on agenda setting,4 foremost because the se-
lection stage of our model is a process of endogenous agenda selection, but also because of the
use of sequential elections in this literature. The topic has been treated from the point of view
of legislative bargaining, and by the literature on sequential agenda. While this literature aims
at modeling the whole process of amendments and modifications of a proposal, we only model
the initial decision of placing an issue on the agenda, and account for the process between the
selection and the decision stage with the assumption that it generates uncertainty at the outset
about the final proposal. Other papers that endogenize the selection of proposals are Barbera
and Coelho (2010) in which a committee votes on a list of names among which a third party can
then make a choice, and Copic and Katz (2007) in which some members of the committee pro-
pose a certain move from the status quo along an idiosyncratic dimension, and a speaker then
decides which of these moves will be considered in the decision voting procedure. In particular,
they are irrelevant when the cost of acquiring information is low. Our main result has a similar
flavor: players attenuate the effect of a change in the decision rule, whereas they amplify the
effect of change in the selection rule.
4See the introduction of Bernheim et al. (2006) for a nice review of this literature.
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2 The Model
Voting Procedure. We consider a committee of n ≥ 2 voters indexed by i. The voting
procedure has two stages, the selection stage and the decision stage. At the selection stage, an
issue is placed on the agenda if at least ns committee members select it, where ns ∈ {1, · · · , n}
is the selection rule. If the issue is not selected, the status quo is maintained. If it is selected,
the agents vote again to decide whether to adopt a proposal or maintain the status quo. The
proposal is adopted if more than nd committee members vote in favor, where nd ∈ {1, · · · , n}
is the decision rule.
Preferences and Information. If an issue is selected, the voters face a pair of alternatives:
the status quo and the proposal. Since there are two alternatives, we need only keep track of the
difference in payoffs between them. It is therefore without loss of generality that we normalize
the payoff from the status quo to 0. Let ui be the value of the proposal for i.
There is an individualized cost c of organizing the second round that has to be paid by
each committee member if the second round is reached. We place no restriction on this cost
which can be positive or negative. If it’s negative, this cost can be thought of as the cost of
processing information for each member of the committee but without any possibility to free-
ride. Alternatively, it could be the cost of organizing the second round election split among
committee members, or an opportunity cost. The cost may be negative if the committee
members value the second round, because for example they are eager to learn more about the
issue at stake.
Information about the proposal is incomplete at the outset, so that i only knows a signal xi
about her value. When an issue is selected and added to the agenda, more information becomes
available to the voters enabling them to learn ui. We consider a private value framework. Signals
are private as well.
Formally, each pair (ui, xi) is drawn independently according to the same joint distribution
measure p(.) on U × X, where U ⊆ R and X is a real interval. We can work with either of
8
the following assumptions: (i) U is an interval and p(.) can be described by a density function,
or (ii) U is finite. Then we can use the conditional distribution that we will write p(u|x) and
interpret as a probability density function in the first case or a probability mass function in
the second case. The proofs are written for case (i) but can be easily adapted to case (ii).
Similarly, our assumptions imply that we can characterize the marginal distribution on U by a
function pU(.) which is either a probability density function or a probability mass function, and
the marginal distribution on X by a probability density function pX(.). We make the following
additional assumptions about the distribution.
Assumption 1 (Preference Uncertainty). U ∩ R∗+ 6= ∅ and U ∩ R∗− 6= ∅.
Preference Uncertainty means that a voter may be uncertain about whether she will even-
tually favor the proposal or the status quo.
Assumption 2 (No Indifference). p(.) has no atom at (0, x), for every x.
The No Indifference assumption implies that a voter is almost surely not indifferent between
the proposal and the status quo.
Assumption 3 (Full Support). p(.) has full support on U ×X.
Full support implies that a voter with private information x may have a value of the proposal
anywhere on U . Together with the Preference Uncertainty assumption, it implies that a voter
can never be sure whether she will prefer the proposal or the status quo. The full support
assumption makes the discussion easier but is not a necessary assumption and we explain how
to relax it in Section 6
Assumption 4 (Compactness). X is a compact interval [x, x]
The compactness assumption is a useful technical assumption. We need it to prove the
comparative statics results with positive costs, and the existence of an equilibrium. The com-
parative statics results for c ≤ 0 hold without the compactness assumption. We also make the
natural assumption that the voters always have a finite expected payoff.
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Assumption 5 (Integrability). E
(|u| |x) <∞, for every x.
We assume that (u, x) is strictly affiliated. This assumption is key to all our results. Given
our assumptions affiliation can be defined by the following monotone likelihood ratio property.
Assumption 6 (Strict Affiliation). p(u|x) is strictly log-supermodular in (u, x). Equivalently,
for every x′ > x, the ratio p
(
u|x′)/p(u|x) is strictly increasing in u.
As usual, the interpretation of affiliation is that higher signals mean better news about the
value of the proposal. Note that the independence from one another of the pairs (ui, xi) implies
that the vector (u1, · · · , un, x1, · · · , xn) is affiliated. We provide some examples of specifications
satisfying our assumptions at the end of Section 3.
Strategies and Pivotal Equilibria. A selection strategy of voter i is a function σi : X →
{0, 1} mapping a type xi to a ballot, where 1 means that i votes in favor of selecting the
proposal. For notational simplicity, we do not consider mixed strategies. This is without loss
of generality since we show below that all the best replies feature essentially pure strategies.
We say that a selection strategy σ is a threshold strategy if there exists a threshold t ∈ X such
that σ(x) = 1 for every signal x > t and σ(x) = 0 for every x < t.
We consider sequential equilibria in weakly undominated strategies so as to avoid equilibria
in which voters vote against their preferences in the second round. Taking this as given, we can
focus on the first stage game and look at it as a static game. In the first round, any selection
strategy of voter i is a best reply to a strategy profile of other voters such that i is almost
surely never pivotal. But even though the probability that i is pivotal is 0, the pivotal event is
still the only one in which her vote may matter. This suggests the following selection criterion
for equilibria. We say that a selection strategy σi that is a best reply to σ−i is a pivotal best
reply if it remains a best reply when conditioning on the event that i is pivotal given σ−i. Of
course the set of best replies and the set of pivotal best replies to a profile σ−i coincide if the
probability that i is pivotal given σ−i is positive. We will say that a strategy profile σ is a
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pivotal equilibrium if for every i, σi is a pivotal best reply to σ−i. In what follows we will focus
on symmetric pivotal equilibria.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
We start by recalling the following result implied by affiliation. The proof is standard except
in the details. For this reason, and to make the paper self-contained, we give a proof in
Appendix A. The calculations are based on Milgrom (2004).
Lemma 1. If g(u) is nondecreasing and not constant, and E
(
g(u)|a ≤ x ≤ b) exists for some
values of a and b, then it is strictly increasing in a and b.
Decision Stage. Since we ruled out weakly dominated strategies, no matter what observa-
tions a player is allowed to make between rounds, she votes for her preferred policy at the
decision stage. Therefore we can take this sincere voting behavior as given and proceed to
analyze the first-stage game.
Selection Stage. To a profile x = (x1, . . . , xn) of signals, we can associate a profile (p1, · · · , pn)
of probabilities to prefer the proposal for each voter, defined by pi = p(u > 0|xi). A voter i

























where Ni = N r {i} is the set of all voters except i. Indeed, i will vote for the proposal in the
second stage whenever u > 0, winning if a coalition C of at least nd−1 other players (sincerely)
vote likewise. If u < 0, she will not support the proposal, and incur a loss if a coalition of at
5Note that this function does not satisfy the information smallness assumption of Gerardi and Yariv (2007),
hence allowing for deliberation does not necessarily make different selection rules equivalent as to the sets of
sequential equilibria in weakly undominated strategies that they generate.
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least nd other voters concur against the status quo. If the issue is not selected, the status quo
prevails and the expected utility of a voter is 0. We can write Ui = U(xi,x−i). By affiliation
and Lemma 1, U(.) is strictly increasing in a voter’s own type xi.
Even though the values of the policies for the voters are private and independent as well as
their informational types, the two-round process links a voter’s value of selecting an issue to
the types of other voters so that the first round has the analytical features of a common value
election. In particular, the first round of this procedure can aggregate some information. This
information is not about the quality of the proposal or the status quo, or any other factor that
affects the values of the voters for these outcomes. It is about the number of voters likely to
vote for the proposal at the decision stage.
When making her first-stage voting decision, the voter only knows her signal xi about the
value of the final proposal, and must therefore compute the expected value of (1). If she is
rational, she conditions her computation on the event Ei ≡
{∑
j∈Ni σj(xj) = ns − 1
}
that her
vote is pivotal, and compares it to the null payoff that she obtains if the issue is not selected.
Because the expression in (1) is strictly increasing in xi, voters use threshold strategies.
6 From
now on, we identify strategies with the corresponding threshold.
In order to understand the information conveyed by the pivotal information we introduce
some notations. We define p(t) ≡ p(u > 0|x ≥ t), the probability of eventually favoring the
proposal conditionally on having received a signal x above t, and p(t) ≡ p(u > 0|x ≤ t),
the probability of eventually favoring the proposal conditionally on having received a signal x
below t. Also let p˜ ≡ p(u > 0) denote the unconditional probability of eventually favoring the
proposal. Under strict affiliation, Lemma 1 implies that these functions are strictly increasing
in t. Furthermore, they satisfy that for every t in the interior of X, 0 < p(t) < p˜ < p(t) < 1.
Let Y (t) be a generic Bernoulli random variable that takes the value 1 with probability p(t).
We denote by Y 1, Y 2, · · · , Y k an i.i.d. sample of size k of this random variable. Similarly, Y (t)
is a generic Bernoulli random variable with parameter p(t).
6Other strategies are dominated. The prescription of the strategy when xi = ti, which is an event of measure
0 because pX(.) is atomless, is essentially irrelevant for the analysis.
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Now, suppose voters other than i use a threshold t ∈ X. Conditional on her vote being
pivotal, voter i knows that exactly ns − 1 of the other n − 1 voters have a private signal that
lies above t. Therefore she estimates that the tally of votes that will be ultimately cast in favor
of the proposal if the issue is selected is given by the random variable
S(t) = Y 1(t) + · · ·+ Y ns−1(t) + Y 1(t) + · · ·+ Y n−ns(t).
Hence the expected gain from selection for a voter of type x who is pivotal is given by
pi(x, t) ≡ E(u1u>0|x)Pr(S(t) ≥ nd − 1)+ E(u1u<0|x)Pr(S(t) ≥ nd)− c.
This expected payoff can be interpreted with the terminology of Strulovici (2010). The
expected loser trap is equal to the expected relative loss incurred by a pivotal voter when the
proposal is eventually imposed on her by other voters when she would have chosen the status
quo. It is equal to
L(x, t) = E(u1u<0|x)Pr(S(t) ≥ nd).
Similarly, the expected winner frustration is the relative loss incurred by a pivotal voter when
the status quo is eventually imposed on her, and it is equal to
W(x, t) = −E(u1u>0|x)(1− Pr(S(t) ≥ nd − 1)).
And pi(x, t) can be decomposed as the sum of these two control sharing effects, the payoff the




, and the cost of
experimentation




+W(x, t) + L(x, t)− c.
By affiliation, pi(x, t) is strictly increasing in x. The best reply of a player of type x to
a threshold t ∈ X is therefore to use the threshold β(t) equal to the unique x at which the
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expected payoff from validation pi(x, t) changes sign. If there is no such x, either this expected
payoff is always negative and then β(t) = x or it is always positive and then β(t) = x.
When t ∈ {x, x}, the probability that the voter is pivotal is almost surely 0, and therefore
any strategy is a best reply. But the function β(.) is always defined at x and x, and it uniquely
defines pivotal best replies at these points. Elsewhere, best replies and pivotal best replies
coincide.
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium Characterization). Every selection strategy that is not a threshold
strategy is never a pivotal best reply. The symmetric pivotal equilibria are exactly the fixed
points of β(.).
Proof. See Appendix A.
In particular, equilibrium strategies are essentially pure strategies in the sense that voters
may be mixing at the threshold but nowhere else. We can find examples with multiple equilibria
in (x, x). In the rest of the paper, we denote by T ∗(ns, nd, c) the set of fixed points of β(.) for
given voting rules ns and nd.
Example 1 (Binary Preferences). Suppose that the utility from the proposal can take only
two values −u− < 0 and u+ > 0. By a simple transformation, we can reinterpret the signal
xi of a voter i as the probability pi that she will eventually prefer the proposal. Then, from
a transformation of the marginal pX(.), we can obtain the distribution F (.) of pi which is









. When other voters use a threshold t ∈ [0, 1], the expected payoff voter i




S(t) ≥ nd − 1
)− (1− pi)u− Pr(S(t) ≥ nd)− c.
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Example 2 (Normal Preferences). Suppose that the preferences of an individual with signal x
follow the normal distribution N (x, σ2) and that the marginal distribution of the signals is given
by a distribution F (.) on the interval
[−χ, χ]. Then all our assumptions are satisfied. We have
p(u > 0|x) = Φ(σx), p(t) = ∫ χ
t
Φ(σx)dF (x)/(1− F (t)) and p(t) = ∫ t−χ Φ(σx)dF (x)/F (t).
In Lemma 4, Appendix B, we prove that the best reply function β(t) is continuous, and
therefore the existence of a fixed point follows from Brouwer fixed point theorem. The com-
pactness of X is important for this result.
Proposition 2 (Existence). There exists a symmetric pivotal equilibrium.
We say that an equilibrium is responsive if agents react to their private information. If
β(.) has a fixed point at x, we have an irresponsive equilibrium in which all voters always vote
for selection in the first stage. If there is a fixed point at x, it constitutes an irresponsive
equilibrium in which voters always vote against selection. The next result determines when
such equilibria arise and is an immediate corollary of Proposition 1.
Corollary 1. There exists an irresponsive equilibrium in which all voters vote against selection





There exists an irresponsive equilibrium in which all voters vote in favor of selection at the






4 Effects of the Rules
The properties of the equilibria are tied to the ratio which measures the contribution of a voter
to the probability that the proposal prevails in the second round, conditional on her being
pivotal in the first round
R(t, ns, nd) ≡
Pr
(






where the dependence on ns comes from the definition of S(t). This link can be seen by noting
that the expected payoff pi(x, t) has the same sign as the expression












To study R(t, ns, nd), we rely on the following general property of sums of Bernoulli random
variables which we prove in Appendix B.
Lemma 2. Let {Yk}∞k=1 be a sequence of independently distributed Bernoulli random variables
that take value 1 with probability pk, and let Σ ≡
∑K
k=1 Yk for some integer K. Then for any
nonnegative integer q ≤ K, the probability Pr (Σ ≥ q) is strictly increasing in pk for any k ≤ K
and strictly decreasing in q; and the ratio
ρ =
Pr (Σ ≥ q − 1)
Pr (Σ ≥ q)
is strictly decreasing in pk for any k ≤ K and strictly increasing in q.
Another way of formulating the first point about ρ is to say that the function g(p1, · · · , pn; q) ≡
Pr (Σ ≥ q) is strictly log-supermodular in (pk, q) on [0, 1]×{0, · · · , K}. The second point about
ρ says that the affine extension of g(q) to [0, K] is strictly log-concave.
Lemma 2 has three implications for R(.). First, R(.) is strictly increasing in nd. Second, it
is strictly decreasing in ns. Indeed, increasing ns to n
′
s > ns amounts to switching n
′
s − ns of
the Bernoulli random variables of the type Y (t) in S(t) to random variables of the type Y (t),
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and we know that p(t) < p(t). Finally, R(.) is strictly decreasing in t since by Lemma 1 p(t)
and p(t) are both strictly increasing in t.
The sense of variation of pˆi(x, t), and hence of β(t), with respect to t, ns or nd is easy to




move in the same direction. With




move in opposite directions
in response to a change in ns or nd. Intuitively, the effect of R should dominate if the cost c
is small. This is true, but the proof requires some work to show that it is possible to find a
strictly positive upper bound on the cost that will work for any change in t, ns or nd.
The fact that β(.) is nondecreasing in t when c ≤ 0 is a form of strategic complementarity:
as all other voters symmetrically increase their common selection threshold, a voter wants to
increase her own threshold.
This complementarity may disappear as c becomes positive for the following reason. Suppose
other players are using a very low threshold t and the selection rule ns is low, one-vote for
example. Then conditional on being pivotal, a voter expects all other voters to have a very
low probability of preferring the proposal, p(t). But then the probability that the proposal is
eventually accepted is very low and does not justify the cost of the second round except if the





increases faster than the ratio R(t) as p(t) goes down to 0. Hence
the best reply to a low threshold of other voters is a high threshold.
Proposition 3 (Best-Reply Comparative Statics).
(i) The best reply function β(t) is nondecreasing in c.
(ii) There exists an upper bound c > 0 such that for every c < c, the best reply β(t) is
nondecreasing in ns, and nonincreasing in nd.
(iii) If c ≤ 0, the best reply β(t) is nondecreasing in t.
Any variation of β due to a variation in one of these parameters is strict if either one of the
initial or the final value of β is in (x, x).
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Proof. See Appendix B.
To study the effects of the voting rules on equilibrium thresholds, we use the following
partial order on subsets of X: for every S, T ⊂ [0, 1], S ≤ T if and only if inf S ≤ inf T and
supS ≤ supT , with at least one of the inequalities holding strictly. If T = {t} is a singleton, we
will write S ≤ t to simplify notations. The following proposition is a corollary of Proposition 3
which says how the best-reply function varies with the rules. We look at the set of equilibria as
the image of a function T ∗(ns, nd, c) from the set of voting rules to the subsets of X. Given the
sense of variation of β(.) with respect to ns, nd and c, the comparative statics on equilibrium
thresholds follows from an application of Milgrom and Roberts (1994, Corollary 1).
Proposition 4 (Effects of the Rules). T ∗(ns, nd, c) is nondecreasing in c. If c < c, then
T ∗(ns, nd, c) is also nondecreasing in the selection rule ns and nonincreasing in the decision
rule nd.
Hence equilibrium selection thresholds increase with the selection rule and decrease with
the decision rule. The latter is not very surprising: the harder it is for the proposal to pass the
second round, the more willing voters are to bring the issue to the ballot. The first result may
seem more surprising: the more difficult the institution makes it for an issue to be selected, the
more selective the voters become. In other words, they fail to offset the effect of the selection
rule, and accentuate it instead. Suppose for example that the voters always play according to
the maximal stable equilibrium threshold t∗ = supT ∗. Then the ex ante probability that any
given vote is cast in favor of selection pX(x < t
∗) decreases as ns increases.
Note that conditional on being pivotal, selecting an issue when the selection rule is more
stringent means that the proposal is more likely to pass. However, because voters keep the
option of voting against the proposal in the second round, the driving force is more subtle.
What matters to a voter is the ratio between the probabilities that the proposal eventually
passes conditionally on being pivotal at the selection stage, whether she eventually supports it
or not. What we showed is that a more stringent selection rule makes it relatively more likely
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that the issue passes when the voter eventually doesn’t support it compared to when she does.
In order to compensate for that, the voter becomes more selective. Remarkably, even though
the intuition for this result is not obvious at first, our proof shows that it holds very generally
since it does not depend on the distribution of preferences and signals or on the size of the
committee, and it resists the introduction of a small cost of moving to the second round.
Our comparative statics results are for negative or sufficiently small positive costs. Intuition
suggests that the comparative statics is reversed when costs are high. Indeed, the cost term in
the modified payoff function pˆi(x, t) becomes dominant drives the comparative statics. As the
cost rises, however, voters are less and less inclined to select, and they may completely stop to
do so before the comparative statics is reversed.
The intuition of our results can also be understood in the terminology of Strulovici (2010).
For that note first that the magnitude of the winner frustration effect |W(x, t)| is increasing in
x, while the magnitude of the loser trap effect |L(x, t)| is decreasing in x, so that the first effect
dominates when the voter has a strong signal about the value of the proposal (high x), while
the second dominates when she is more likely to lose from the proposal (low x). Note also that
pi(x, t) is increasing in x so that the best reply threshold β(t) will be low when the cost c is
low and high when it is high. Altogether, this means that, in determining the best reply, the
winner frustration effect dominates when c is high whereas the loser trap effect dominates when
c is low. Our calculations show that the effect of making the selection rule ns more selective
is to decrease the magnitude of the winner frustration effect and to increase the magnitude of
the loser trap effect. Hence at lower costs, where the loser trap effect dominates, an increase
in ns makes experimentation less attractive and the voters more conservative. At higher costs,
however, the winner frustration effect dominates and an increase in ns makes the voter less
conservative. The analysis is similar for the effect of the decision rule.
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5 Democratizing the Agenda
In this section, we compare our results to situations in which the decisions are partially or
completely dictatorial. The decision is fully dictatorial if a given member of the committee
decides for the committee in both rounds. It is partially dictatorial if a given member of the
committee, the agenda setter, decides on selection, but the final decision is democratic. This
allows us to understand the effect of democratizing the decision process.
We consider first a decision process entirely controlled by a dictator. Then she knows that
she will adopt the proposal in the second stage if and only if she ends up preferring the proposal.
Therefore her payoff from selecting the proposal in the first stage is given by
pidict(x) ≡ E(u1u > 0|x)− c,
and she will opt to select whenever this payoff is positive, and refuse to select whenever it is
negative. Because pi(x) is strictly increasing in x, there exists a unique threshold tdict(c) ∈ X
such that the full dictator adopts the corresponding threshold strategy. It is easy to show that
tdict(c) is nondecreasing in c. Because for every t and every x, pi(x, t) < pidict(x), any best
reply threshold β(t) must be greater than the fully dictatorial threshold tdict. This implies that
regardless of the voting rule, the full dictator is less conservative than any given committee
member in the democratic process. Intuitively, in the terminology of Strulovici (2010), the
dictator faces no control loss effect, and is therefore always more willing to experiment. The
consequence on the probability of selection is that sufficiently stringent selection rules will be
less likely to select an issue than full dictatorship, but we cannot conclude for milder selection
rules.
Proposition 5. For any voting rule (ns, nd), any cost c, we have
T ∗(ns, nd, c) ≥ tdict(c).
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Furthermore, for any t∗ ∈ T ∗(ns, nd, c) which is in the interior of X, we have t∗ > tdict(c).
Fixing nd and c, there exists a cutoff Ns ≤ n such that for every ns ≥ Ns the probability that
the issue is selected is higher in the dictatorial process than in any equilibrium of the democratic
process with voting rule (ns, nd).
Proof. See Appendix C
Next we consider the case of a partial dictator, the agenda setter, who only controls the
selection process. The voting rule at the selection stage is still denoted nd. This may be more
relevant for policy considerations as it is often the case that the chairman of a committee
controls its agenda. To study the behavior of the agenda setter, let Z be a binomial random
variable with parameters p˜, and n − 1. Recall that p˜ = p(u > 0) is the probability that a
random voter eventually favors the proposal in the absence of additional information. Z is the
random variable the agenda setter would use at the selection stage to estimate the tally of votes
in favor of the proposal at the decision stage in addition to her own. Then the payoff of the









Pr (Z ≥ ns)− c.
As before, Lemma 1 implies that pias(x) is strictly increasing in x so that the agenda setter
will use a threshold strategy with a threshold tas(nd, c). It is easy to adapt our proofs in Section 4
to show that tas(nd, c) is nondecreasing in c and nonincreasing in nd for every negative or positive
but sufficiently small cost. We can also show that regardless of the decision rule, the agenda
setter is more conservative than a committee member under the one-vote selection rule, but less
conservative than a committee member under the unanimous selection rule. In particular, the
probability that an issue is selected under the one-vote selection rule is always greater than the
probability that it is selected by the agenda setter which is itself greater than the probability
of selection under unanimous selection.
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Proposition 6. There exists a strictly positive bound cˆ ≤ c such that for every c < cˆ and every
fixed decision rule nd, we can find two thresholds 1 ≤ N1s ≤ N2s ≤ n such that
T ∗
(
N1s , nd, c
) ≤ tas(nd, c) ≤ T ∗(N2s , nd, c).
Furthermore, for every ns ≤ N1s , the probability of selection is lower under partial dictatorship
than under the selection rule ns. There exists N
3
s ≥ N2s such that for every ns ≥ N3s , the
probability of selection under partial dictatorship is greater than under the rule ns.
Proof. See Appendix C
A corollary of Proposition 6 is that there exists two selection rules N1s and N
2
s whose
corresponding sets of equilibrium thresholds can be ordered in the strong set order, that is
any t1 ∈ T ∗(N1s , nd, c) and any t2 ∈ T ∗(N2s , nd, c) satisfy t1 ≤ t2. In particular, the sets of
equilibrium thresholds corresponding to one-vote and unanimity can be ranked in this way.
Irrational Voters. The partial and the full dictatorship thresholds can also be interpreted
as heuristics for the behavior of voters that are not fully rational. Another plausible heuristics
is that irrational voters opt for selection whenever their expected payoff from the proposal is
higher than the cost of moving to the second round. Such voters do not take into account
the existence of a second round of voting. Then they act as if their payoff from selection was
E(u|x) − c. By Lemma 1, this payoff is strictly increasing in x, and hence naive voters use
a threshold strategy with threshold tnaive(c). They are more selective than any other voters
because they ignore the option value afforded by the existence of a second round.
Proposition 7. There exists a strictly positive bound c˜ ≤ c such that for every c < c˜, and
every voting rule (ns, nd),
tnaive(c) ≥ T ∗(ns, nd, c)
Proof. See Appendix C
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Welfare. We examine welfare from the point of view of a utilitarian social planner taking
democratic decision making as a constraint, that is we fix a certain decision voting rule nd,
and our benchmark is the optimal selection policy of a utilitarian social planner who possesses
all the ex interim information (the vector x of private signals) at the selection stage. The











where N+(u) = # {j|uj > 0}. The next calculation shows that the structure of this payoff is


































































where the first equality is by linearity of the expectation, the second equality is a decomposition
between disjoint events, the third equality is by independence across agents, and in the final
expression, Z(x−i) is the sum of n− 1 independent Bernoulli random variables that take value
one with respective probability pˆ(xj) = p
(
u > 0 |xj
)
, for j 6= i.
By Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, this function is strictly increasing in each xi. Then we know that
there exists a manifold of dimension n− 1 that can be described by the equation xi = H(x−i),
where the choice of i is irrelevant and H : Rn−1 → R is nonincreasing in each of its terms,
























Figure 1: Welfare in a two-voter committee with fixed decision rule. The shaded zone
represents the set of signals that lead to a second round if (a) the selection rule is unanimity,
(b) the selection rule is one-vote, (c) voter 1 is the agenda setter, (d) the agenda setter is a
utilitarian social planner with all the ex interim information (the exact shape of the curve is
fictitious, we only know that it is nonincreasing and symmetric).
whenever xi < H(x−i) (the social planner is indifferent when x is on the manifold). The fact
that the same functions H(.) can be used regardless of the choice of i is a consequence of the
symmetry assumed in our framework. The case of a two-voter committee is illustrated in panel
(d) of Figure 1 (the exact shape of the curve in the figure is fictitious, the only restriction is
that it must be nonincreasing and symmetric).
As the figure suggests, a first step in order to compare the outcome of democratic agenda
setting to the utilitarian optimal policy is to compare their outcomes on the diagonal. Suppose
then that the social planner has received the same informative signal x for each voter. Then,
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∣∣∣x1 = · · · = xn = x)− c.
Then applying (2), and letting Z(x) denote the sum of n− 1 independent Bernoulli random
variables taking value 1 with probability pˆ(x) = p
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And the social planner will opt for selection whenever x > tspnd and for rejection whenever
x < tspnd , where t
sp
nd













crosses 0 (x if it stays above 0, x if it stays below 0).
Lemma 1 implies that for every t in the interior of X, we have p(t) < pˆ(t) < p(t). Then, by
applying Lemma 2, we can show that the socially optimal threshold on the diagonal is between
the one-vote threshold and the unanimity threshold. More precisely:
Proposition 8 (Welfare). There exists csp > 0 such that for every c < csp, and every nd we
can find two selection rules N1s ≤ N2s such that
T ∗
(
N1s , nd, c
) ≤ tspnd(c) ≤ T ∗(N2s , nd, c).
In particular, any equilibrium of the one-vote selection rule always selects weakly too often and
any equilibrium of the unanimity selection rule weakly too seldom.
Proof. See Appendix C
The intuition for the last point of the proposition can be most clearly understood by looking
at panel (d) of Figure 1: if the limit of the selection region is given by a nonincreasing function
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that cuts the diagonal between the one-vote and the unanimity thresholds, the optimal selection
region must be a subset of the lowest one-vote equilibrium selection region and a superset of
the highest unanimous equilibrium selection region. Note that the proposition does not say
whether there exists a voting rule that implements the utilitarian optimal outcome.
To answer this question, we now go back to Example 1 where agents have homogeneous
values conditional on whether they prefer the proposal to the status quo. In this case there
may be a conflict of interest in the second period, but there is no issue of preference intensity.
Then the decision rule n∗d = dnu−/(u− + u+)e is socially optimal upon reaching the second
round. In this case, it is natural to consider the problem of the social planner where the second
round rule is fixed to n∗d. But since the second round rule selects the proposal whenever the
sum of utilities across agents is positive and we can rewrite the utility of the social planner with














But then it is clear that for c ≤ 0, the socially optimal choice is to always select. And we have
the following corollary of Proposition 8.
Corollary 2. If preferences are binary and the decision rule is n∗d, then if c ≤ 0 the one-vote
selection rule achieves the social optimum which is to always select.
If agents do not have homogeneous values, however, there is no decision rule that implements
the social optimum at the second stage. This is the usual remark that voting rules fail to account
for preference intensities. In this case, even if the cost c is 0, the first stage of voting may be
worthwhile because it provides the social planner with an additional control for optimization.
It seems unlikely, however, that this additional control gives enough flexibility to implement
the optimum.
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6 Alternative Rules and Other Extensions
Sequential Procedures. Actual selection procedures often do not have the structure of our
basic simultaneous game. For example, in the case of petitions, the process of gathering sig-
natures is usually sequential. Dekel and Piccione (2000) showed that in symmetric binary
elections, the informative symmetric equilibria of the simultaneous voting game are also se-
quential equilibria of any sequential voting structure in a certain class. The selection stage
of our game is a symmetric binary election that falls in the scope of applications of the first
theorem7 of Dekel and Piccione (2000). Therefore our equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous
selection game applies to any sequential selection procedure in this class, which consists of all
the games with T <∞ periods such that each voter is called to vote in some period, and voting
may be simultaneous in some periods.
Subcommittees. In some committees such as the United States Congress, issues are selected
within a subgroup of the voters. To describe this procedure we let nS ≥ ns be the number of
voters in the subcommittee. Making the same assumptions about preferences and information,
and considering the voting decision of a member of the selecting committee, it is clear that,
conditional on being pivotal, and provided other players are using a threshold t, the random
variable that describes the belief of a player about the tally of votes that will finally be cast in
favor of the proposal is
S˜(t) = Y 1(t) + · · ·+ Y ns−1(t) + Y 1(t) + · · ·+ Y nS−ns(t) + Y˜1 + · · ·+ Y˜n−nS ,
where Y˜ is a generic Bernoulli random variable that takes the value 1 with probability p˜,
The best reply of a voter to all other players playing with a common threshold t is the value
7That is up to the following detail: for notational convenience, Dekel and Piccione (2000) show their result
for a finite type space whereas our type space is the unit interval. The extension of their proof to this case is
immediate however.
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of the signal x at which her expected payoff from selection conditional on being pivotal,
p˜i(x, t) ≡ E(u1u>0|x)Pr(S˜(t) ≥ nd − 1)+ E(u1u<0|x)Pr(S˜(t) ≥ nd)− c,
changes sign.
The equilibria exist and can be characterized as in Proposition 1 by the fixed points of β˜(.).
The comparative statics with respect to ns and nd work as before. Another question that can be
considered here is the effect of increasing the size of the subcommittee. If the size is increased
by 1, then the result depends on whether ns is also increased by 1 or not. In the first case, one
random variable of the type Y˜ is replaced by a random variable of the type Y (t) in S˜(t) and
since p ≥ p˜ for all t, the increased size leads to an increase of the set T˜ ∗ of fixed points of β˜(.).
In the second case, one random variable of the type Y˜ is replaced by a random variable of the
type Y (t) in S˜(t) and since p ≤ p˜ for all t, the increased size leads to a decrease of the set T˜ ∗
of fixed points of β˜(.).
Relaxing Full Support. If the full support assumption is not satisfied, there may exist
signals that make their receiver certain that she will prefer the status quo, and others the
proposal. Since these signals can be ordered by the affiliation assumption, let
(
xˇ, xˆ) be the
interval of signals such that the voter is uncertain about her preferences, with xˇ < xˆ. Then for
any signal x ≤ xˇ, p(u > 0|x) = 0 and for any x ≥ xˆ, p(u > 0|x) = 1. Then it is clear that the
pivotal best-reply to any threshold t ≤ xˇ should be the same, and similarly for t ≥ xˆ. So we
only need to define the pivotal best-reply to xˇ and xˆ. This is never a problem for xˆ, but there
may be a problem at xˇ, because p(xˇ) = 0. Indeed, if ns ≤ nd then in the pivotal event, there
are at least n− ns individuals with a null probability of preferring the proposal, implying that
the proposal stands no chance in the second round. If c < 0, the best reply is clearly to always
select, that is β(t) = xˇ for every t ≤ xˇ. If c > 0, the best reply is to never select β(t) = xˆ
for every t ≤ xˇ (note that this argument proves that there is no hope of extending the result
that β(.) is nondecreasing in t to the case x > 0). The only difficulty is if c = 0. Then any
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threshold is a best reply. A natural way to proceed, however, is to select the limit of β(.) as











We have developed a model of issue selection in committees which predicts that voters are more
conservative when the selection rule is more stringent. The decision rule has the opposite effect.
Our analysis has been conducted in a pure value framework. It would be interesting to allow
for correlations in preferences, but it is hard to derive any conclusions in the general case.
Our model is well suited for experimental testing, and we are currently designing experi-
ments. These experiments could also serve as a test of pivotal voting in a context that differs
significantly from the literature. In particular, voting behavior should not depend on the se-
lection rule unless voters are trying to infer something from the outcome of the first stage,
and hence are conditioning on a particular event. Our results could also be tested directly on
institutional data. But the rules of institutions such as the Supreme Court rarely change, if at
all, making identification potentially difficult.
Finally, our model may have normative applications. Our welfare analysis sheds some light
on how to choose an agenda-setting procedure for emerging or established institutions that
have no explicit rules, such as the Committee of Permanent representatives of the European
Union. Our results can also be applied to citizens’ initiatives, a procedure that has recently
been introduced or extended in several European countries. The wide variety of committees
that use, or could use, selection rules calls for a better understanding of their effect, and offers
several potential applications for this research.
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A Equilibrium Characterization
Proof of Lemma 1: Affiliation. We prove the result for a change in b, and it is easy to
adapt the proofs to a change in a. We start by proving that p
(
u|a ≤ x ≤ b) is strictly
log-supermodular in (u, b). To this effect, let b′ > b and u′ > u and note that
p
(
u′|a ≤ x ≤ b′)
p
(









u′|x)dx pX(a ≤ x ≤ b)pX(a ≤ x ≤ b′) =




 pX(a ≤ x ≤ b)
pX(a ≤ x ≤ b′)
>




 pX(a ≤ x ≤ b)
pX(a ≤ x ≤ b′) =
p
(
u|a ≤ x ≤ b′)
p
(
u|a ≤ x ≤ b) .
The inequality follows from the affiliation inequality for the terms under the integral sign. Next
we show that the cumulative density function p(u ≤ v|a ≤ x ≤ b) is strictly log-supermodular
in (v, b). To that effect, let b′ > b and v′ > v
p
(
u ≤ v′|a ≤ x ≤ b′)
p
(




u|a ≤ x ≤ b′)du∫ v
−∞ p
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u ≤ v′|a ≤ x ≤ b)
p
(
u ≤ v|a ≤ x ≤ b) .
This implies that p(u|a ≤ x ≤ b) is nondecreasing in b in the first-order stochastic dominance
order as for every v such that inf U < v < supU
p
(
u ≤ v|a ≤ x ≤ b′)
p
(
u ≤ v|a ≤ x ≤ b) < limv′→∞ p
(
u ≤ v′|a ≤ x ≤ b′)
p
(
u ≤ v′|a ≤ x ≤ b) = 1.
Let k ∈ Kg index the set of points uk ∈ U where g is not continuously differentiable. By
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monotonicity, Kg is countable. Fixing some v ∈ U , we can write that for every u ∈ U ,














where δ(uk) is the size of the positive jump in the value of g at uk. Then by Fubini’s theorem,
we can write that
E
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u ≤ t|a ≤ x ≤ b)dt,
and this expression is nondecreasing in b by the first-order stochastic dominance result that
we just proved. If g is not constant, then either g′(t) is strictly positive on a subset of U with
positive measure, or δ(uk) is strictly positive for some k ∈ Kg. In either case, we can invoke
the full support assumption to conclude that
E
(
g(u)|a ≤ x ≤ b)
is strictly increasing in b.
Proof of Proposition 1: Equilibrium Characterization. The expected utility of voter i
if the issue is selected, conditional on the event Ei that her vote is pivotal, is given by E (Ui|Ei).
The event that a voter is pivotal does not contain any additional information about her own
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The function under the expectation is nondecreasing in u. It is not constant either because
the full support assumption implies that every pi is in (0, 1) and therefore the expectations
conditioned on the pivotal event are strictly positive. Hence Lemma 1 implies that the expected
payoff of validation is strictly increasing in the private signal. Hence any best-reply to a profile
of strategies σ−i such that the pivotal event Ei has a positive probability is a threshold strategy.
For profiles σ−i such that the probability of the pivotal event is null, every strategy is a best
reply.
In a symmetric equilibrium, all the voters use the same threshold t, and Ei is the event that
exactly ns − 1 voters in Ni have a type p above t. The expected value of their type is then
p(t), while for the n− ns other voters in Ni, it is p(t). Because the types are independent, the
expected payoff from validation conditional on being pivotal is given by pi(x, t). The rest of the
argument is in the main discussion.
B Comparative Statics and Existence
We start this section with a useful lemma, then we proceed to the proofs of the results in the
text.
Lemma 3. Let {Yk}∞k=1 be a sequence of independently distributed Bernoulli random variables
that take value 1 with probability pk, and let Σ ≡
∑K
k=1 Yk for some integer K. Then for any
integer q,
Pr (Σ ≥ q)2 ≥ Pr (Σ ≥ q − 1) Pr (Σ ≥ q + 1) ,
and the inequality is strict if 0 ≤ q ≤ K.
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Proof. The proof works by induction on K. For K = 1, we have
Pr (Σ ≥ q)2 =

1 if q ≤ 0
p21 if q = 1
0 if q ≥ 2
,
and
Pr (Σ ≥ q − 1) Pr (Σ ≥ q + 1) =

1 if q ≤ −1
p1 if q = 0
0 if q ≥ 1
,
hence the claim is satisfied.
Suppose that the claim holds at some K ≥ 1 and let Σ′ = Σ + Y where Y is a Bernoulli
random variable that is independent from (Y1, · · · , YK) and takes value 1 with probability p.
First note that if q ≥ K + 1 or q ≤ 0, the claim holds trivially for Σ′. Hence we assume that
1 ≤ q ≤ K. We have
Pr (Σ′ ≥ q)2 =
(
pPr (Σ ≥ q − 1) + (1− p) Pr (Σ ≥ q)
)2
= p2 Pr (Σ ≥ q − 1)2 + 2p(1− p) Pr (Σ ≥ q − 1) Pr (Σ ≥ q) + (1− p)2 Pr (Σ ≥ q)2
> p2 Pr (Σ ≥ q − 2) Pr (Σ ≥ q) + 2p(1− p) Pr (Σ ≥ q − 1) Pr (Σ ≥ q)
+(1− p)2 Pr (Σ ≥ q − 1) Pr (Σ ≥ q + 1) ,
where the inequality holds by the induction hypothesis. Pr (Σ′ ≥ q − 1) Pr (Σ′ ≥ q + 1) is equal
to
(
pPr (Σ ≥ q − 2) + (1− p) Pr (Σ ≥ q − 1)
)(
pPr (Σ ≥ q) + (1− p) Pr (Σ ≥ q + 1)
)
= p2 Pr (Σ ≥ q − 2) Pr (Σ ≥ q) + p(1− p) Pr (Σ ≥ q − 1) Pr (Σ ≥ q)
+p(1− p) Pr (Σ ≥ q − 2) Pr (Σ ≥ q + 1) + (1− p)2 Pr (Σ ≥ q − 1) Pr (Σ ≥ q + 1) .
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Therefore Σ′ satisfies the claim whenever
Pr (Σ ≥ q − 1) Pr (Σ ≥ q) ≥ Pr (Σ ≥ q − 2) Pr (Σ ≥ q + 1) .
Multiplying both sides by Pr (Σ ≥ q − 1) Pr (Σ ≥ q) > 0, we obtain an inequality that holds by
the induction hypothesis, and this concludes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2. It is clear that Pr
(
Σ ≥ q) is strictly decreasing in q ≤ K. For the sense
of variation with respect to pk, we let Σ
′ = Σ− Yk and write that
Pr
(
Σ ≥ q) = pk Pr(Σ′ ≥ q − 1)+ (1− pk) Pr(Σ′ ≥ q),
where the two probabilities on the right-hand side do not depend on pk and are strictly positive.
The sense of variation of the ratio with respect to q is a direct consequence of Lemma 3.
For the sense of variation with respect to pk, we can write
ρ =
pk Pr (Σ
′ ≥ q − 2) + (1− pk) Pr (Σ′ ≥ q − 1)
pk Pr (Σ′ ≥ q − 1) + (1− pk) Pr (Σ′ ≥ q) ,
where the probability functions do not depend on pk. A little algebra shows that the derivative
of ρ with respect to pk has the same sign as
Pr (Σ′ ≥ q − 2) Pr (Σ′ ≥ q)− Pr (Σ′ ≥ q − 1)2 ,
which is strictly negative by Lemma 3.
As a preliminary to the proof of the best-reply comparative statics, we prove the following
lemma. This lemma is also needed for the existence result in Proposition 2. To read this lemma,
recall that
R(t, ns, nd) =
Pr
(







and that the expected payoff pi(x, t) has the same sign as the expression












which can therefore be used to determine the best reply function β(t).
Lemma 4 (Continuity).
(i) The functions p(t) and p(t) are continuous in t.
(ii) The function












is continuous in t and c.
(iii) The best reply function β(.) is continuous in t and c.
Proof. We write the proof of point (i) for p(t) and it can easily be adapted to p(t). By defintion,8
p(t) = p
(




















For every t, the functions pX(x)1x≥t and p(u, x)1u>01x≥t are dominated respectively by pX(x)
and p(u, x) which are integrable. Hence the dominated convergence theorem implies the conti-
nuity in t of these two integrals. Since pX(x ≥ t) is strictly positive for every t, this proves the
continuity of p(t).
8We can write these formulas with weak or strict inequalities given the assumption that the distribution is
atomless on X.
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pˆi(x, t) is clearly continuous in c, so we only need to prove the continuity in t. First note
that Pr
(






are clearly continuous in p(t) and p(t) and always
strictly positive. But then (ii) is a direct consequence of (i).
For (iii), we need to show that the continuity of pˆi(x, t) in t implies the continuity of β(t).
Suppose by contradiction that β(t) is not continuous. Then we can find a sequence (tn) converg-
ing to a point t∗ and a closed neighborhood [a, b] of β(t∗) such that for every tn, β(tn) /∈ [a, b].
Either infinitely many β(tn) are strictly greater than β(t
∗) or infinitely many β(tn) are strictly
lower than β(t∗). Suppose the former is true (the proof is symmetric in the other case). Then
we can extract from (tn) a new sequence (t
′
n) that converges to t
∗ such that for every n,
β(t′n) > b > β(t
∗). By definition of β(.) and because pˆi(x, t) is strictly increasing in x, we have
pˆi(b, t∗) > 0 and pˆi(b, t′n) < 0 for every n. But since (t
′
n) converges to t, the continuity of pˆi(b, t)
with respect to t implies that pˆi(b, t∗) ≤ 0, a contradiction. The proof of the continuity of β(.)
with respect to c is identical.
Proof of Proposition 3: Best-Reply Comparative Statics. Point (i) is straightforward,
and the argument for the comparative statics when c ≤ 0 is given in the text, and results di-
rectly from Lemma 2. This proves point (iii). The difficulty is to extend the comparative statics
of point (ii) to small positive values of c.
Under the continuity assumption, pˆi(x, t) is continuous in t by Lemma 4 and strictly increas-
ing in x by Lemma 1. By definition, β(t, θ, c) is the unique x at which the function









crosses 0 (x if this function stays above 0, x if the function stays below c), where θ is the vector




. Consider a change from θ to θ′ 6= θ such
that θ and θ′ differ in one dimension only. We know from Lemma 2 that any such change
results in strict variations of R and Ψ in opposite directions. Suppose R(t, θ′) > R(t, θ) and
Ψ(t, θ′) < Ψ(t, θ), hence the change is either an increase in nd or a decrease in ns. Let Θ be the
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set of such pairs (θ, θ′) of voting rules.
To study the effect of one-dimensional changes of the voting rule, define the function
∆(x, t, c, θ, θ′) ≡ pˆi(x, t, θ′)−pˆi(x, t, θ′) = E(u1u>0|x) (R(t, θ′)−R(t, θ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
−c (1/Ψ(t, θ′)− 1/Ψ(t, θ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
,
which is strictly increasing in x by Lemma 1, continuous in t and c by Lemma 4. Because ∆(.)
is strictly increasing in x, we have ∆(x, t, c, θ, θ′) ≥ ∆(x, t, c, θ, θ′). Whenever c ≤ 0 the change
from θ to θ′ strictly increases pˆi, that is for every c ≤ 0, t ∈ X and (θ, θ′) ∈ Θ, ∆(x, t, c, θ, θ′) > 0.
∆(x, .) is continuous in t and X is compact, and Θ is finite, therefore it attains its minimum
value on X ×Θ. Therefore, for every c ≤ 0
∆˜(c) ≡ min
(t,θ,θ′)∈X×Θ
∆(x, t, c, θ, θ′) > 0,
and furthermore, by Berge maximum theorem, this function is continuous in c. But then there
must exist some c > 0 such that for every c < c we have ∆˜(c) > 0. Therefore, for every c < c,
x ∈ X, t ∈ T and every (θ, θ′) ∈ Θ,
∆(x, t, c, θ, θ′) ≥ ∆(x, t, c, θ, θ′) ≥ ∆˜(c) > 0.
This implies that any change of rule in Θ leads to the same comparative statics when c ≤ 0
and when c < c.
C Democratizing the Agenda
Proof of Proposition 5. The argument showing that T ∗(ns, nd, c) ≥ tdict is given in the text.
This implies that for any t ∈ T ∗(ns, nd, c), we have pX(x > t) ≤ pX(x > tdict). But for a rule ns
the probability of selection is not equal to pX(x > t). However we know that the probability of
selection is nondecreasing in ns. And if ns = n (the unanimity rule), the probability of selection
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corresponding to t ∈ T ∗(n, ns, c) is pX(x > t∗)n ≤ pX(x > tdict). The rest of the proposition
follows from the monotonicity of the probability of selection with respect to ns.
Proof of Proposition 6. Consider the difference between the random variables Z and Sn(t). In
the latter, ns − 1 of the n − 1 Bernoulli random variables composing the sum have increased
in probability of being equal to 1, from p˜ to p(t), while the other have decreased from p˜ to
p(t). Under the unanimous selection rule, therefore, they have all increased, whereas under the
one-vote selection rule, they have all decreased. Given Lemma 2, we know that this implies
that for c ≤ 0 the result of the proposition holds. To prove it for sufficiently small positive c, we
just need to mimic the proof of Proposition 3 where we add one value ns = as in the selection
dimension of the parameter space.
Proof of Proposition 7. The naive voter weighs E(u1u>0|x) and E(u1u<0|x) equally with the








< 1, and R(t, ns, nd) >
1. Therefore, the naive threshold is always above the rational threshold if c ≤ 0. For sufficiently
small positive costs, we mimic the proof in Proposition 3 where we add a point in Θ for each
change from a given voting rule to the naive voter.
Proof of Proposition 8. We define the following function from X ×X → R
pˆispnd(x, t) = E
(
u1u>0|x









and denote by pˆinsnd(x, t) the modified expected payoff function of the pivotal voter as before,
where we introduced the indexes ns and nd to make the dependence on the voting rule explicit.
The fact that p(t) ≤ pˆ(t) ≤ p(t) and Lemma 2 together imply the following inequalities for any
c ≤ 0, that we can extend to every c < csp where the existence of csp > 0 is proved by using
the same technique as in the proof or Proposition 3:
pˆins=nnd (x, t) ≤ pˆispnd(x, t) ≤ pˆins=1nd (x, t),
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for every x and t. Denoting by βspnd(t) the x at which pˆi
sp
nd
(x, t) crosses 0 (x if it stays above 0,
x if it stays above 0), these inequalities imply the following inequalities
βns=nnd (t) ≥ βspnd(t) ≥ βns=1nd (t).
Now note that the interval T spnd of values at which the function pˆi
sp
nd
(x) crosses 0 must also be
the set of fixed points of βspnd(t). But then we can use Milgrom and Roberts (1994, Corollary 1)
as in Proposition 4 to conclude that
T ∗(ns = 1, nd, c) ≤ tspnd(c) ≤ T ∗(ns = n, nd, c).
The statement of the proposition then results from the monotonicity of T ∗(ns, nd, c) in ns which
was proved in Proposition 4.
The fact that H(.) is nonincreasing then implies that for t ∈ T ∗(1, nd, c) and t′ ∈ T ∗(n, nd, c),
the selection region corresponding to t for the one-vote selection rule is a superset of the selec-
tion region corresponding to the social planner, and the selection region corresponding to the
equilibrium t′ for the unanimous selection rule is a subset of the selection region corresponding
to the social planner, which leads to the second point of the proposition.
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